By then, the reasonable doubt standard had become widely accepted as the accurate description of the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal of a criminal defendant' s State courts gradually accepted the reasonable doubt standard, each following its own time line in accepting itl4 Studies of early decisions of the state courts have revealed that many state appellate courts did not require trial courts to use the reasonable doubt standard until after they had already begun to use it. 15 The standard's growing acceptance was concurrent with judicial attempts to explain the meaning of reasonable doubt. 16 In addition to its growing importance in case law, the reasonable doubt standard appeared frequently in nineteenth-century treatises.
The Court in Winship posited two purposes of the reasonable doubt standard to support its holding. 25 First, the reasonable doubt standard is a "prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error" since the standard "provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence." 26 The standard is necessary because the defendant in a criminal case "has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." 2 7 Second, the reasonable doubt standard is "indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law." 28 The reasonable doubt standard instills confidence in the community that the criminal justice system will not convict innocent people.
9
After the Supreme Court's decision in Winship secured constitutional status for the reasonable doubt standard, the Court's involvement in the reasonable doubt standard has largely been to define how and to what extent the reasonable doubt standard needs explaining. While it is well established that courts and juries must apply the reasonable doubt standard when determining the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant, 3 0 neither the majority opinion nor the concurrence in Winship discussed whether the Constitution requires jury instructions defining the standard. 31 The Court in Taylor v. Kentucky9 2 held that the trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence constituted a violation of due process. 3 3 The Court further noted that if trial courts defined the reasonable doubt standard, the Constitution did not require any particular words to instruct the jury as to the appropriate burden of proof. 3 In handling constitutional challenges to specific reasonable In its evaluations of the constitutionality of reasonable doubt jury instructions, the Court has only once held that a reasonable doubt jury instruction given by a trial court violated due process. In Cage v. Louisiana, 3 7 the defendant appealed his conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder, arguing that the reasonable doubt jury instruction was unconstitutional. In a per curiam decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the instruction was inimical to the reasonable doubt standard articulated in Winship. 3 8 In reaching its decision that the reasonable doubt instruction was unconstitutional, the Court, following Francis, inquired whether a reasonable juror "could have" interpreted the instruction to allow conviction on proof that did not satisfy the reasonable doubt standard which the Due Process Clause requires. Since the Court's decision in Cage, the Court has altered the inquiry for appellate review articulated in Francis and followed in Cage. Reviewing two Californiajury instructions used in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, the Court in Boyde v. Calformia'0 determined that the proper inquiry was whether there is a "reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction" in a way that violates the Constitution. 4 1 The Court rejected the "could have" test that it used in finding the Cage instruction unconstitutional, concluding that the "reasonable likelihood" test "better accommodates the concerns of finality and accuracy." 4 2 While acknowledging that an inter-35 471 U.S. 307 (1985) . In Francis, the Court held that the trial court's jury instruction on intent in the context of the instruction as a whole violated the 14th Amendment. Id. at
325.
Determining that the deficiency in the instruction was not harmless error, the Court affirmed the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 326. 36 Id. at 316. The more narrow inquiry in Francis was whether a reasonable juror "could have understood [the instruction on intent] as a mandatory presumption that shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the element of intent once the State had proved the predicate acts." Id.
37 498 U.S. 39 (1990). 38 Id. at 40-41. 39 Id. at 41. 40 494 U.S. 370 (1990). In Boyde, the Court held that two California jury instructions used in the penalty phase of defendant's capital murder trial did not preclude the jury's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant, and the jury instructions did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 386.
41 Id. at 380. See also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (using the "reasonable likelihood" test developed in Boyde). In Estelle, the Court held that neither the introduction of challenged evidence at defendant's murder trial nor the jury instruction on the use of the challenged evidence violated the Due Process Clause. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75. 42 Id.
994
[Vol. 85 est in ensuring an "accurate determination of the appropriate sentence" in a criminal case, the Court in Boyde stressed that its approval of the "reasonable likelihood" inquiry protected the "equally strong policy" against requiring retrial years after the first trial where the "claimed errors amount to no more than speculation." 43 In Estelle v. McGuire, 44 the Court further elaborated on its standard for review of challenged jury instructions and stated that the "instruction 'may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole." 45 Most recently, the Court held, in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 46 that the giving of a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction was among those constitutional errors that required an automatic reversal of the conviction. 4 7 In doing so, the Court rejected the lower court's finding that the erroneous instruction was harmless error. 48 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.
SANDOVAL V. CALIFOINIA On 14 October 1984, Alfred Arthur Sandoval shot and killed both Gilbert Martinez and Anthony Aceves and wounded Manuel Torres in a gang-related incident in Los Angeles. 49 Seventeen days later, Sandoval entered the home of Ray and Marlene Wells and shot and killed Ray Wells because he had given information to the police concerning the Martinez and Aceves murders. 5 0 Sandoval then killed Marlene Wells because she had seen Sandoval kill her husband. 5 1 At trial, Sandoval argued that he had killed Martinez and Aceves in self-defense, and Sandoval further presented an alibi defense for the Wells murders. 52 The trial court gave the following reasonable 43 Id. 44 502 U.S. 62 (1991) . 45 Este!/e, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973) doubt instruction to the jury at the end of the guilt phase of the trial: A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 53 The jury convicted Sandoval of four counts of first degree murder and, in addition, found that Sandoval used a firearm in the commission of each offense and had committed multiple murders. 54 After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury sentenced Sandoval to death for the murder of Marlene Wells and to life in prison without possibility of parole for the murders of Martinez, Aceves, and Ray Wells. 55 Following Sandoval's convictions and sentences, he was accorded an automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court. 56 On appeal, Sandoval presented ten contentions concerning the guilt phase of the trial proceedings 57 and eight regarding the sentencing phase. 5 57 On appeal, Sandoval argued these nine issues in addition to the issue of the reasonable doubt jury instruction: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the Martinez and Aceves murders from the Wells murders; (2) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to exercise his peremptory challenges to excuse from the jury those prospective jurors who had expressed concern about the imposition of the death penalty;, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his gang membership as it was irrelevant and prejudicial to his defense; (4) the trial court improperly excluded evidence of third party culpability as to the Wells murders; (5) the trial court erred in ruling that his prior conviction for assault with intent to commit murder would be admissible for impeachment purposes; (6) the trial court's refusal to rule on the scope of permissible cross-examination if he took the witness stand to testify on the Martinez and Aceves murders violated his right to testify on his own behalf; (7) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in his questioning of the forensic psychiatrist who testified as an expert witness for the defense; (8) the prosecutor committed multiple instances of prejudicial misconduct during the cross-examination of Ralph Ortega who was Sandoval's alibi witness with respect to the Wells murders; and (9) the prosecutor committed additional instances of prejudicial misconduct. Id. at 869-78. 58 In the penalty phase, Sandoval argued that (1) the erroneous admission of his gang affiliation during the guilt phase prejudiced him in the penalty phase since he had to call Richard Rodriguez, a gang consultant with the California Youth Authority, to rebut the evidence of his gang affiliation and the prosecutor improperly cross-examined Rodriguez; part of his appeal, Sandoval, citing Cage, claimed that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was constitutionally flawed. 59 Regarding the issues Sandoval raised concerning the guilt phase of the trial, the California Supreme Court found no merit in Sandoval's assignments of error. 60 With respect to Sandoval's argument that the trial court's reasonable doubt jury instruction was unconstitutional, the court stated that "similar challenges" to the instruction had been raised and rejected in People v. Jennings 6 ' and in People v. Johnson. 62 In these cases, the court had noted that "despite use of the term 'moral certainty' in CALJIC 2.90, the instruction does not suffer from the flaws condemned in Cage." 63 In addition, the court stated that changes in the reasonable doubt instruction needed to come from the California Legislature."
The court also examined each of the assignments of error Sandoval made concerning the penalty phase of the trial.65 Although the court determined that the biblical references the prosecutor made during his final argument were improper and constituted misconduct, the court found that the misconduct did not require reversal of the penalty imposed upon Sandoval. 66 On 14 December 1992, the court affirmed Sandoval's convictions and sentences.
67
Following the affirmance of his convictions and sentences, Sandoval filed a petition for rehearing, which the California Supreme Court (2) the court improperly allowed the jury to consider his age as a factor in aggravation; (3) the prosecutor violated Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) , and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) , by urging the jury to consider characteristics of the victims and the loss suffered by the victims' families; (4) the prosecutor violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, separation of church and state, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment by quoting biblical authority in his final argument; (5) the trial court coerced the jury's verdict by requiring it to continue deliberating after the jury had declared a deadlock; (6) the trial court erred in requiring thejury to return a separate penalty verdict as to each of the four murder victims since the multiple verdicts prevented the jury from reaching a determination of the appropriate sentence taking into account all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (7) the instruction on the standards for determining the penalty verdicts did not inform the jury that a necessary condition for imposition of the death penalty is a finding that aggravation outweighs mitigation rather than merely being "so substantial in comparison"; and (8) the cumulative effect of the errors during the penalty phase of the trial required reversal of the penalty imposed. Id. at 880-86.
59 Id. at 878. Sandoval filed his contention as to the unconstitutionality of the "reasonable doubt" instruction in a supplemental brief. On 26 December 1987, Clarence Victor went to the home of eighty-two-year-old Alice Singleton, a woman for whom he had previously done gardening work. 7 ' Upon entering her home, Victor hit Singleton with his hand and knocked her down, struck her in the head three times with a pipe, cut her throat with a knife, 72 and then left. 73 The medical examiner determined that Singleton died from the laceration of a branch of the carotid artery with subsequent hemorrhaging; it took approximately three to five minutes for her to bleed to death. 74 Following the closing arguments of Victor's trial, the court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter, and on the material elements of each crime. 7 5 The court informed the jury that if the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the material elements of a particular crime, then it was the jury's duty to find Victor not guilty of that particular crime. 7 6 The trial court gave the following jury instruction:
"Reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the same time, absolute or mathmatical certainty is not required. You may be convinced of the truth of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet be fully aware that possibly you may be mistaken. You may find an accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is (1) the court should have suppressed statements by Victor to the Omaha police department; (2) NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (d) is unconstitutionally vague and allows for arbitrary application in a capital sentencing proceeding, (3) the threejudge sentencing panel improperly considered evidence of his 1964 manslaughter confession in support of its finding that the prosecution proved NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (a) beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the prosecution proved NEB. Rrv. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (d) beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) the three-judge sentencing panel erroneously found that he had not proven mitigating circumstance NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(2) (g); and (6) the three-judge sentencing panel erred in finding the sentence of death was not disproportionate or excessive. Victor, 235 Neb. at 773. Section 29-2523(1) (d) reads: "[tihe murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standard of morality and intelligence." Section 29-2523(1) (a) allows the existence of an aggravating circumstance where the defendant had been "previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the use of the threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity." Finally, § 29-2523 (2) (g) reads: "At the time of the crime, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental illness, mental defect, or intoxication." (Neb. 1993 ). Victor based his petition on alleged violations of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and alleged violations of article I, sections 3, 9, and 13 of the Nebraska Constitution. The other seven issues Victor argued were that (1) the reweighing process for aggravating and mitigating circumstances engaged in by the Nebraska Supreme Court was unconstitutional; (2) the Court improperly imposed the death penalty because the aggravating circumstance in NEB. RE,. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (d) is vague and results in an arbitrary imposition of capital punishment; (3) the three-judge sentencing panel and the Nebraska Supreme Court erroneously refused to consider defendant's inability to conform his conduct to law because of mental defect or intoxication as required by NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2) (g); (4) neither the three-judge sentencing panel nor the Nebraska Supreme Court compared the facts of his case with other cases of same or similar circumstances to determine the proportionality of defendant's sentences with other cases; (5) the threejudge sentencing panel erroneously admitted defendant's confession to a 1964 manslaughter as the confession did not conform to Miranda requirements; (6) his confession to the Singleton murder was not voluntary, was a product of an unlawful arrest, and was obtained without a valid waiver of his Miranda rights; and (7) trial and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise or in improperly raising each of the aforementioned issues. 92 Victor also argued that the court erred in (1) refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing; (2) failing to appoint counsel to represent him for his motion to vacate his sentence the Nebraska Supreme Court, "finding no merit in the assignments of error properly before this court," affirmed the decision of the district court "in its entirety." 93 The court, relying on its decision in State v. Morley, rejected Victor's contention that the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt suggested a higher degree of doubt than that required under the Fourteenth Amendment. 94 In Morey, the court upheld the constitutionality of a nearly identical reasonable doubt instruction. 95 The court held that Victor's assigned error had been decided by the Morey opinion and was, thus, meritless. 9 6 Victor filed a motion for rehearing on 8 February 1993. Ct. 1239 Ct. , 1243 Ct. (1994 . The Supreme Court consolidated these cases at 114 S. Ct. 40 (1994) .
101 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, iI, and IV, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined, and in which Justice Ginsburgjoined with respect to Parts I-B and IV.
in Victor and in Sandoval properly communicated the idea of reasonable doubt. 10 2 The Court found no "reasonable likelihood" that the jury interpreted the instructions improperly.
10 3 Justice O'Connor also examined the attempts made by the California and Nebraska pattern jury instruction committees to define reasonable doubt in their respective jury instructions.1 0 4
Justice O'Connor first clarified the due process requirements concerning the reasonable doubt standard.' 0 5 According to her analysis, "so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt .... the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." 1 0 6 Following its precedent, the Court did not prescribe a certain definition of reasonable doubt for jury instructions.
As to the current state of the law, Justice O'Connor noted that, in Cage, 10 7 the Court held that the trial court's definition of reasonable doubt violated the Due Process Clause.' 0 8 Subsequently, the Court in Estelle v. McGuire,' 0 9 clarified that the proper inquiry as to whether the jury instruction is unconstitutional is "not whether the instruction 'could have' been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it." 110 After reviewing the current case law on the constitutionality of jury instructions on reasonable doubt, Justice O'Connor stated that the constitutional question presented by the consolidated cases of Victor and Sandoval was "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard"' of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Next, Justice O'Connor examined each of Sandoval's objections to the reasonable doubt instruction." 7 In a lengthy exposition of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century legal texts that define the concepts "moral evidence" and "moral certainty," she developed a historical context to evaluate the continuing validity of the phrases."1 8
AlthoughJustice O'Connor willingly conceded that the phrase "moral evidence" is "not a mainstay of the modem lexicon," she asserted that she did not think the phrase "means anything different today than it did in the 19th century."" 9 Justice O'Connor found support for this conclusion in the fact that three modern dictionaries that define "moral evidence" provide definitions which are consistent with the original meaning. What is reasonable doubt? ... It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending upon moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds ofjurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. duced at trial." 122 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor found the phrase "unproblematic" in combination with other instructions steering the jurors to the evidence presented at trial. 123 Thus, she concluded that the phrase "moral evidence" would not inappropriately cause the jury to consider the ethics or morality of Sandoval's criminal acts. 124 Justice O'Connor'next addressed Sandoval's objection that the phrase "moral certainty" had changed meaning since the nineteenth century, which allowed the jury to convict on proof that did not meet the reasonable doubt standard. 12 5 Justice O'Connor readily admitted that, as "[w]ords and phrases can change meaning over time .... 'moral certainty,' standing alone, might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt." ' 26 Although Sandoval based his objection on dictionary definitions that defined the phrase in terms of probability,' 27 Justice O'Connor determined that the "reasonable doubt standard is itself probabilistic."
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The concern, Justice O'Connor said, should not be that the jury would take into account probability, but that the jury would understand the phrase to mean "something less than the very high level of probability required by the Constitution in criminal cases." 12 9 Sandoval argued further that the phrase "moral certainty" allowed the jury to convict without restricting its consideration to the evidence adduced at trial.13° Justice O'Connor distinguished the use of the phrase "moral certainty" in the instruction given in Sandoval from its use in the instruction the Court deemed unconstitutional in Cage. She asserted that in the Cage instruction "there was nothing else did "not condone the use of the phrase." 1 3 3 Paying tribute to Sandoval's argument that the meaning of the phrase has changed since the nineteenth centuryJustice O'Connor remarked that the common understanding of the phrase "moral certainty" may continue to change until it conflicts with the reasonable doubt standard. 3 4 Notwithstanding this veiled warning, Justice O'Connor found the phrase "moral certainty" constitutional because, "in the context of the instructions as a whole," the phrase did not make it "reasonably likely" that the jury understood the phrase to allow it to convict on proof lower than the reasonable doubt standard or on factors other than the government's proof.13 5
Justice O'Connor then briefly examined Sandoval's objection to the trial court's jury instruction that a reasonable doubt is "not a mere possible doubt." 13 6 Justice O'Connor rejected Sandoval's challenge of this phrase, determining that the sentence as a whole made clear that a reasonable doubt was to be based on reason, and that, even though everything "is open to some possible or imaginary doubt," such a doubt would not qualify as a reasonable doubt.' 3 7
Victor v. Nebraska
Justice O'Connor then turned to the jury instruction given by the trial court in Victor. l3 8 As in Sandoval, Justice O'Connor first looked to the historical underpinnings of the instruction. She traced the content of the Victor instruction both to the instruction given by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster, 3 9 and to a series of nineteenth-century Nebraska cases approving the use of reasonable doubt instructions and equating reasonable doubt with an "'actual doubt' that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act." 140 Justice O'Connor examined each of the objections Victor raised to the reasonable doubt instruction. 14 1 Agreeing that the "substantial doubt" construction was "somewhat problematic," Justice O'Connor contrasted two definitions of "substantial" found in a modern dictionary, stating that, "[o] n the one hand, 'substantial' means 'not seeming or imaginary'; on the other, it means 'that specified to a large de- gree." ' 42 Justice O'Connor determined that the latter, "'commonly understood" ' 14 3 definition could imply that a greater degree of doubt is necessary for acquittal.1 4 4 However, since the phrase "substantial doubt" was "'distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture,'" it was clear that the instruction did not misstate the reasonable doubt standard.' 45 To support her conclusion that "substantial doubt" was acceptable, she noted that, in contrast to the court's instruction in Victor, the unconstitutional instruction in Cage did not distinguish between a substantial doubt and a fanciful doubt. 146 Additionally, the Court in Cage did not hold that the use of the phrase "substantial doubt" made the instruction unconstitutional. 147 Finally, without elucidating the reasoning for her conclusion, Justice O'Connor found that in the context of the court's instruction in Victor "substantial" implies an existence of a doubt rather than the magnitude of the doubt. 148 As a result, she found no cause for concern that the instruction possibly overstated the degree of doubt required for acquittal. 
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termined that the context of the phrase "moral certainty"-"such a doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused,"-increased the chance that the jury would interpret the phrase correctly. 54 Determining that the instructions equated a "doubt sufficient to preclude moral certainty with a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act," she concluded that since a person "morally certain of a fact would not hesitate to rely on it," that fact must have "been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 15 5 According to Justice O'Connor, the language of the instruction as a whole ensured that the jury did not interpret the phrase "moral certainty" to mean that it could convict on proof that failed to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard or on factors other than the proof presented by the government at trial. 15 6 As in her discussion of the instruction given in SandovalJustice O'Connor discouraged the use of the phrase "moral certainty," but nonetheless asserted that its inclusion in the instruction the court in Victor gave did not diminish its constitutionality. 157 Justice O'Connor summarily disposed of Victor's final objection to the reasonable doubt instruction that the reference to "strong probabilities" reduced the government's burden of proof. Again looking at the context of the phrase, Justice O'Connor found that the entire instruction, qualifying "strong probabilities" as "such probabilities [that] are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable," cured any possible problem with the phrase. 158 163 but wrote separately to express his belief that some of the phrases to which Sandoval and Victor objected "confuse far more than they clarify."' 64 Pointing to California's use of the phrase "moral evidence," he stated that its inclusion in the reasonable doubt instruction is "indefensible," and, although the majority provided the derivation of the phrase, it is clear that "for jurors who have not had the benefit of the Court's research, the words will do nothing but baffle."' 65 Nevertheless, he agreed with Justice O'Connor's determination that the use of the phrase "moral evidence" does not necessitate finding the California reasonable doubt instruction unconstitutional. 166 Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that the "inclusion of words so malleable, because so obscure, might in other circumstances have put the whole instruction at risk." 16 7
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND

CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT
Justice Ginsburg agreed that the reasonable doubt instructions in Victor and Sandoval satisfied the Constitution's due process requirement. In addition, the instructions conveyed to the jurors the idea that they should focus only on the evidence presented.
1 68 In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg addressed the issues raised by the instruction in Victor's appeal.
Apart from agreeing with the majority that the "moral certainty" phrasing "should be avoided as an unhelpful way of explaining what reasonable doubt means," Justice Ginsburg found two other features of the reasonable doubt instruction in Victor unhelpful. 169 First, Justice Ginsburg criticized the instruction's definition of reasonable doubt as "such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon."' 7 0 Using published criticisms of the "hesitate to act" formulation as support,' 7 1 Justice Ginsburg indicated that the instruction's analogy between an individual's decision-making process in his or her personal affairs and a juror's decision-making process in deciding the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant was inapplicable and ambiguous.
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Justice Ginsburg next turned to the instruction which informed the jury that it could "find an accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable."
173 Justice Ginsburg criticized such an instruction for its "uninstructive circularity."' 7 4 As Justice Ginsburg succinctly stated, "Jury comprehension is scarcely advanced when a court 'defines' reasonable doubt as ' Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. Discussing only the instruction in Victor, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for its misapplication of the Court's opinion in Cage, 181 because he found "no meaningful difference" between the reasonable doubt instruction in Victor and the one in Cage. 18 2 Comparing the text of the Cage instruction with that of the Victor instruction, he found a strong similarity in both instructions' equations of "substantial doubt" with reasonable doubt, and references to "moral certainty" as opposed to "evidentiary certainty." 8 3 While acknowledging that the Victor instruction does not include the phrase "grave uncertainty," found objectionable by the Court in the Cage instruction, Justice Blackmun found that the Vctor instruction "contains language that has an equal potential to mislead."' If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. 
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derstood, means "that specified to a large degree," Justice Blackmun rejected her assertion that the jury would not have interpreted substantial in this manner because, in contrast to its use in Cage, the phrase "substantial doubt" was used to distinguish reasonable doubt from mere conjecture. 1 8 6 Instead, he asserted that the instruction in Cage did use the phrase "substantial doubt" to distinguish reasonable doubt from "mere possible doubt," and that it was not the instruction's failure to provide the "appropriate contrasting language" that doomed the instruction in .Cage.' 8 7 In Justice Blackmun's view, the Court found the instruction in Cage unconstitutional simply because "'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard." 88 Next, Justice Blackmun attacked the majority's assertion that the instruction in Cage was flawed only because of the combined use of the phrases "substantial doubt" and "grave uncertainty." 89 Looking to the Court's language in Cage, he dismissed this interpretation of the Cage decision, stating that the. Court in Cage had not been preoccupied with the combined use of these two phrases. 90 Rather, the Court declared the instruction in Cage unconstitutional simply because "substantial" suggests a higher degree of doubt.' 9 ' According to Justice Blackmun, the Court in Cage "endorsed the universal opinion" of the federal appellate courts that equating "substantial doubt" with reasonable doubt misstates the necessary degree of doubt under the reasonable doubt standard.' 92 Justice Blackmun then rebutted Justice O'Connor's assertion that the instruction in Victor, in contrast to the instruction in Cage, was saved by providing an alternative definition of reasonable doubt, namely, hesitation to act.' 93 While noting his skepticism of the helpfulness of the "hesitate to act" formulation, Justice Blackmun concluded that the "existence of an 'alternative' and accurate definition of reasonable doubt somewhere in the instruction does not render the instruction lawful if it is 'reasonably likely' that the jury would rely on the faulty definition during its deliberations."' 94 Justice Blackmun illustrated that "the instruction in Cage contained proper statements of the law .... but this language could not salvage the instruction since it remained reasonably likely that ... the jury understood the instruction to require 'a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.'"' 195 Turning to the majority's discussion of the "strong probabilities" language in the instruction in Victor, Justice Blackmun used Justice O'Connor's own mandate that, "'[t]aken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury,"' to refute her dismissal of the phrase's harmful effects. 196 Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for accepting the "strong probabilities" language since, " [c ] onsidering the instruction in its entirety,. . . the 'strong probabilities' language increased the likelihood that the jury understood 'substantial doubt' to mean 'to a large degree. ' "" 97 Associating the word probability with "likelihood," Justice Blackmun concluded that ajury could have a substantial doubt about a defendant's guilt but still convict on the "strong probabilities" of the case where the jury considered it "likely" that the defendant committed the crimes charged. 198 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the instruction in Victor qualified the "strong probabilities" language with language stating that "strong probabilities" are to be "'strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable." ' 199 However, Justice Blackmun found this qualification ineffectual since the succeeding sentence defines a reasonable doubt as a "substantial doubt." 20 0 In this configuration, the purported clarification of the "strong probabilities" language only adds more confusion. 2 0 1
Finally, Justice Blackmun took issue with the reference to "moral certainty" in the instruction in Victor. 20 2 Turning again to Cage, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court condemned the instruction in Cage for its reference to "moral certainty," because of a "real possibility that such language would lead jurors reasonably to believe that they could base their decision to convict upon moral standards or emotion in addition to or instead of evidentiary standards." 20 3 In Justice Blackmun's view, the "moral certainty" language in the instruction in Victor created the same problems. Indeed, Justice Blackmun found that its use in conjunction with the "strong probabilities" and "substantial doubt" language was "mutually reinforcing, both overstating the degree of doubt necessary to acquit and understating the degree of certainty required to convict." The Court incorrectly decided both Victor and SandovaL In rejecting Victor's and Sandoval's constitutional challenges of the definition of reasonable doubt in their respective jury instructions, the Court improperly restricted its recent unanimous holding in Cage to its facts. In determining that the jury instructions were constitutional, the Court failed to address frankly the merits of these appeals in light of its decision in Cage, and in light of a common-sense understanding of reasonable doubt.
The Court relied on eighteenth and nineteenth-century cases and texts to analyze the manner in which a contemporary jury would understand an instruction.
20 9 Adopting such an approach, the Court gave insufficient weight to the fact that the meanings of the objected-to phrases in both instructions have changed over time and that the instructions may not provide twentieth-century jurors with an adequate understanding of the reasonable doubt standard. In fact, as Justice Kennedy hinted, the derivation of a legal phrase is irrelevant to the meaning it suggests in common usage. 2 1 0 Furthermore, the Court did not address the possibility that the average juror may have never had a clear understanding of the language of the instructions-even when initially written. Through the obfuscation of a long discussion concerning the history of the instructions, the Court avoided honestly answering whether the instructions uphold the constitutional mandate to allow conviction only where the prosecution has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
A.
SA-,VDOVAL V. CALIFORNIA
In evaluating the instruction in Sandoval, the Court traced its genesis to the definition by Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court given in 1850 in Commonwealth v. Webster 2 1
The Court stressed the repeated approval of the Webster definition by nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century courts as evidence of its long-term support, 2 12 but ignored contemporaneous and subsequent criticism of that definition. In particular, the Court failed to respond to criticism of the definition's reliance on "moral evidence" and "moral certainty." The Court accepted the Webster definition without analyzing whether it was sound, as if the definition's repeated use overcomes any of its shortcomings.
As early as 1876, a contemporary of Shaw, Judge John Wilder May, characterized the Webster definition as "unsuccessful" and "unfortunate." 2 13 Asserting that the "rules of law should be stated with unmistakable precision," May decried courts' adoption of the "moral certainty" language found in the Webster definition. 2 14 Tracing the origin of the use of "moral certainty" in legal works to its inclusion by Thomas Starkie in his treatise on evidence, 2 15 May criticized the use of Evidence which satisfies the minds of the jury of the truth of the fact in dispute, to the entire exclusion of every reasonable doubt, constitutes full proof of the fact .... Even the most direct evidence can produce nothing more than such a high degree of the phrase in Webster, asking, "why perplex the administration ofjustice by interjecting this new element of uncertainty . .. [for w]hat possible end can such a heaping up of indefinable terms serve, but to confuse and baffle rather than enlighten and aid the average juror?" 2 16 Clearly, May considered the instruction to be counterproductive.
Similarly, Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, criticized the Webster definition for its lack of clarity and utility. 2 17 Though recognizing the repeated use of the definition, Wigmore wrote that "when anything more than a simple caution and a brief definition is given, the matter tends to become one of mere words, and the actual effect upon the jury, instead of being enlightenment, is likely to be rather confusion, or, at the least, a continued incomprehension." 2 18 Thus, Wigmore believed the definition did not help juries decide the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
The The court further charges you that a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, and which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. And if, after an impartial comparison and consideration of all the evidence, you can candidly say that you are not satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if after such impartial comparison and consideration of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. Hopt, 120 U.S. at 439. 223 The Court in Hopt, more familiar with nineteenth-century jurors' ability to comprehend definitions of legal terms than the Rehnquist Court, felt that the use of "moral certainty" made the instruction problematic. Without acknowledging these early criticisms of the Webster definition, the Court looked at nineteenth-century sources affirming the Webster instruction to support its conclusion that the instruction in Sandoval was constitutional. The Court's selective reading of these sources suggests that it was straining to uphold constitutionally suspect convictions.
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that the phrases "moral evidence" and "moral certainty" may not be as accessible to the modem juror as these phrases were to jurors in the nineteenth century.
2 24 Justice O'Connor agreed that: (1) the phrase "moral evidence" is not a "mainstay of the modem lexicon"; (2) "'moral certainty,' standing alone, might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt'"; and (3) "[a] s modem dictionary definitions attest, the common meaning of the phrase [moral certainty] has changed" since the nineteenth century. 2 25 The Court should not have downplayed these concerns, especially after acknowledging historic ambiguity of the phrase. The Court glossed over the admitted problems with the language in the instruction in Sandoval, claiming that the instruction as a whole was acceptable, even though the components of the instruction were not acceptable.
B. VICTOR V AEBRASKA
In reaching its conclusion in Victor, the Court focused on differentiating Nebraska's reasonable doubt instruction from the reasonable doubt instruction given in Cage. The Court's emphasis on distinguishing Cage from Victor suggests that the Court wanted to limit the Cage decision to its facts, and thus, only the precise wording given in Cage itself would prompt the Court to declare an instruction unconstitutional. By limiting Cage in this way, the Court has taken on the task of reviewing claims disputing the constitutionality of reasonable doubt jury instructions on a case-by-case basis, instead of providing decisions with precedential value. As in its analysis in Sandoval, the Court again failed to acknowledge the underlying issue: the language in the instruction in Victor does not adequately convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the modem juror.
After noting that much of the instruction derived from the Webster definition, 2 26 the Court dismissed Victor's challenge that the equation of reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt overstated the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal. 2 27 While acknowledging that the "construction is somewhat problematic," the Court minimized the fact that a modem dictionary defines "substantial" as "specified to a large degree." 2 28 The Court recognized that such a definition could lead ajuror to believe that the degree of doubt required for acquittal was greater than that required under the reasonable doubt standard. 229 Nevertheless, the Court, without elucidating its reasoning, merely assumed that jurors would not consider substantial to mean large because the "context [of the definition] makes clear that 'substantial' is used in the sense of existence rather than magnitude of the doubt." 229 In United States v. Atkins, 487 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1973), the court stated that it did not approve of the equation of reasonable doubt and substantial doubt. Atkins, 487 F.2d at 260. In clarifying this point, the court noted that in an earlier state case, defense counsel had illustrated the difference between "substantial" doubt and "reasonable" doubt by pointing out how differently a person would feel if a person questioned the doctor as to the prospects for a successful outcome of a serious operation and the doctor told him there was a reasonable chance of success as opposed to a substantial chance of success. Id. at 260 n.2. 2s0 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250. No case prior to Vztormakes the same distinction between "magnitude of the doubt" and "existence" of the doubt asJustice O'Connor made in concluding that the phrase "substantial doubt" did not overstate the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal. However, since the Court's decision in Viwtor, lower courts have used the Court's reasoning to find reasonable doubtjury instructions with similar language constitutional. In Middleton v. Evatt, 855 F. Supp. 837 (1994), the court denied defendant's habeas corpus petition in which the defendant challenged the trial court's use of the term "substantial doubt" in its reasonable doubt jury instruction. Middeton, 855 F. Supp. at 852. Although noting that the Court in VWtor acknowledged that the construction "substantial doubt" was "somewhat problematic," the court in Middeton cited the Court's reasoning in Victor and found that, in the context of the sentence in which it was contained and in the context of the entire instruction, the phrase was constitutional. Id. See also State v. Smith, 637 So. 2d 398, 406 (La. 1994) (court found reasonable doubt jury instruction constitutional, finding that the phrase "substantial doubt" was used in the "sense of the existence rather than the magnitude or degree of the doubt necessary to acquit").
phrase" and the instruction in Victor is not "similarly deficient." 23 ' The instruction in Cage also contained accurate statements of law, but was found unconstitutional, and the Court does not explain how correct statements of law can cure an improper statement of law found in the same instruction. Justice Blackmun soundly argued that such transformation of an instruction's lawfulness cannot occur "if it is 'reasonably likely' that the jury would rely on the faulty definition during its deliberations." 2 32 As in its analysis of the language in the instruction in Sandoval, the Court used nineteenth-century support to find the instruction in Victor constitutional. The Court rejected Victor's challenge to the use of "strong probabilities" in the instruction, basing its decision on its 1895 holding in Dunbar v. United States. 23 3 In Dunbar, the Court upheld a reasonable doubt jury instruction that directed the jury to decide the defendant's guilt or innocence "upon the strong probabilities of the case." 23 4 Notably, however, no state besides Nebraska has consistently used "strong probabilities" in its reasonable doubt jury instruction in the twentieth century, making the Court's use of Dunbar as support for its acceptance of the "strong probabilities" language all the more unconvincing. The reasonable doubt instruction in Victor failed to provide the jury with comprehensible statements of the law, thus allowing the jury to convict Victor without an adequate understanding of what constitutes reasonable doubt.
C. REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
The Court did not acknowledge that Nebraska's reasonable doubtjury instruction in Victor and California's jury instruction in Sandoval are in the minority among states in their use of the phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence." Numerous state courts have held that language similar to that found in Sandoval and Victor may mislead jurors to consider issues of morality in determining a defend- reversed -a conviction where the reasonable doubt instruction included "moral certainty" language, finding that "[a] jury instruction which emphasizes what is good or bad-a moral judgment, rather than truth-an evidentiary judgment, is inconsistent" with the proper role of ajury. The court further noted that "moral certainty" language "increases the possibility that ajury may convict [a defendant] because the jury believes he is morally guilty without regard to the sufficiency of the evidence." Id. at 297. In State v. Manning, 409 S.E.2d 372 (S.C. 1991), the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction, holding that the reasonable doubt jury instruction that defined certainty beyond a reasonable doubt and moral certainty as the same, misled the jury "in that it allows ajuror to base a finding of guilt upon a subjective feeling rather than upon an evaluation of the evidence." Id. at 374. In Vance v. State 416 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1992), the Supreme Court of Georgia, holding that a superseded jury instruction that contained "moral certainty" language was not reversible error, stated that such language is "unnecessary." Id. at 518 n.5. The court added that " [w] hat is perceived as 'moral' may differ from group to group, from class to class, and from individual to individual. This diversity renders any precise definition of 'moral certainty' elusive, and any uniformity of interpretations byjurors unlikely." Id.
237 Patternjury instructions emerged in the 1930s as a response to the increasingly technical nature ofjury instructions given by trial courts which were seeking to avoid reversal. 2-3, 13 (1979) . 238 Although outside the scope of this note, federal courts also use pattern jury instructions. One frequently cited instruction does not use the phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence." It reads:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense-the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs. A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof so convincing that you would rely and act upon it without hesitation in the more serious and important transactions of life. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt. NJI2d Crim. 2.0 Reasonable Doubt (1992). The Comment to the instruction stated that the goal of the revised instruction was to "achieve juror comprehension through instructions stated simply, directly, and in plain language." Id. Though states have increasingly moved away from this language, the Court's decision may reverse that trend. 24 6 Although the Court expressed concern that some of the phrases in the instructions were "not ... mainstay[s] of the modern lexicon," and had "lost... historical meaning," and were "somewhat problematic," the Court's decision allows state courts to continue using the challenged phrases. State courts may now point to the Victor and Sandoval decision as an indication that even though the Court may not advocate the use of such phrases, such use will not render the instructions unconstitutional.
D. THE COURT'S MOTIVATION
Even though the Court seemed reticent in its approval of some of the individual phrases contained in the reasonable doubt instructions, the Court stated, in its discussion of the instruction in Sandovai that it was unable to hold the reasonable doubt jury instructions unconstitutional because of its lack of supervisory power over the state courts. The Court failed to acknowledge that in Cage, its most recent decision evaluating a reasonable doubt instruction, the Court did exercise its supervisory power over the state courts. When the Court found in Cage that there was a possibility that the jurors could have interpreted the reasonable doubt instruction incorrectly and therefore may have convicted Cage on a degree of proof lower than that required under 245 Tennessee's reasonable doubt instruction reads as follows: Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does riot mean a captious, possible or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. the reasonable doubt standard, there was no concern that the Court lacked supervisory power over the state courts.
An argument made in the respondent's brief in Victor points to another possible motive for these two decisions. The Court may have been concerned that a contrary decision would lead to innumerable appeals by state prisoners seeking retroactive application of the decision. 248 The Court would then have to review numerous convictions or have its contrary decision result in the reversal of numerous convictions by lower courts because of faulty reasonable doubt jury instructions. 24 9 Since constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt jury instructions cannot be analyzed under the harmless error inquiry, as made clear in Sullivan, 250 this result might require relitigating a multitude of cases. To avoid this burden, the Court contented itself with warnings in the hope of spurring revision of questionable reasonable doubt jury instructions.
Furthermore, the prospect of numerous retrials brings with it the potential release of numerous defendants, and this possibility likely weighed heavily in the Court's deliberation of Victor and Sandovalespecially in light of the particularly brutal facts of these cases. In such cases, the Court might have been particularly hesitant to risk the defendants' retrial and possible release. On balance, however, the prospect of numerous retrials also brings with it the potential release of wrongfully convicted inmates. For this reason, to consider that a contrary decision could lead to the release of numerous defendants would be antithetical to the reasons for the adherence to the reasonable doubt standard cited in Winship. The Court in Winship highlighted its interest in reducing the risk of wrongful conviction due to factual error, and its interest in upholding community confidence in the criminal justice system, by avoiding the conviction of innocent people. To abide by these necessary interests, consideration of distasteful consequences, such as the reviewing of numerous convictions and the possible release of criminal defendants, cannot take precedence.
E. FUTURE OF REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS
The Court failed to take advantage of an opportunity to solve the The Court did not provide any support for its conclusion that modem jurors, despite their possible unfamiliarity with the complex terminology employed injury instructions would understand the legal meaning of those instructions. 254 254 Jerome Frank, critical of the jury system, did not consider jury instructions to be an improvement, stating:
Time and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words which the judge may address to the jury, although everyone who stops to see and think knows that these words might as well be spoken in a foreign language-that, indeed, for all the jury's understanding of them, they are spoken in a foreign language. Although, in the end, the jury must decide the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant, an appropriate reasonable doubt jury instruction would help ensure that no defendant is found guilty on proof insufficient to meet the demands of due process, or upon factors other than the evidence admitted at trial. Some critics of reasonable doubt jury instructions have recommended that there be no attempt to define reasonable doubt for the jury, 259 but this solution seems inadequate, given jurors' documented lack of understanding of the concept. While still ajudge for the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Justice Ginsburg noted that " [t] o arm the jury with the information needed for the intelligent performance of its task, the judge might first endeavor to speak the language of the jurors, and avoid the There may be no clear consensus as to the proper definition of reasonable doubt, but currently the individuals who are responsible for the formulation ofjury instructions are, for the most part, lawyers, judges, law academics, and legislators. 262 There needs to be a greater recognition that, although those intimately connected with the legal system understand legal terms, the average juror does not understand them. 262 In People v. Freeman, 882 P.2d 249 (Cal. 1994), the Supreme Court of California affirmed the defendant's conviction. The trial court had slightly modified CALJIC 2.90 in instructing the jury on the reasonable doubt standard and had informed the jury that the phrase "moral evidence" meant "mortal" evidence or "evidence from people." In rejecting defendant's challenge of the instruction, the court clarified that the Supreme Court had made clear in Victor and Sandoval that trial courts could delete the phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence" from the reasonable doubt jury instruction. The court suggested that the state legislature or the committee responsible for pattern jury instructions examine CALJIC 2.90 as the "clarity and constitutionality of California's instruction on reasonable doubt are too important to simply ignore the high court ' 163, 165 (1977) ("[llegal practitioners ... have developed a traditionally accepted vocabulary with which to express their ideas. Although this legal jargon becomes a common way of expressing precise legal meanings among judges and lawyers, it is often a completely foreign language to the layperson-juror."); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 237, at 100 ("As lawyers speaking to each other use certain words, their knowledge of the underlying case law communicates something more to them than a simple dictionary definition of the word would show. This kind of extra communication, however, is restricted to members of the profession who understand the use behind the word. It does not extend to lay people on juries."). Although the Court disapproved with much of the language in the instructions, the Court upheld the instructions without giving the lower courts a clearer picture of acceptable language to use in the future. In its focus on certain eighteenth and nineteenth-century cases and texts to analyze the constitutionality of the instructions, the Court failed to give satisfactory attention to the common-sense understanding of the instructions. The meaning assigned to such instructions by modem jurors may not comport with the eighteenth and nineteenth-century conception of reasonable doubt.
Most jurors are not well-versed in the law, and reasonable doubt jury instructions are meant to improve juror comprehension, to further the goal of a fair trial. As such, the reasonable doubtjury instructions should be tailored to the average juror. When ajury has based its decision on instructions which include the phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence," it may be compelled to look beyond the evidence presented at trial. The Court's decision affirming the convictions and death sentences of Victor ognize that, despite the Court's decision upholding the reasonable doubt jury instructions, the Court did express concern that the phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence" were problematic. Those responsible for reforming jury instructions should recognize the shortcomings of such reasonable doubt jury instructions. To that end, jurors' understanding of these instructions must receive the utmost attention to protect the constitutional guarantees afforded criminal defendants.
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